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Systems engineering researchers are familiar with a variety of challenges associated with doing foundational research in complex socio-technical systems. Some foundational issues have been avoided by focusing on applied research questions and ignoring the "socio" of the engineering system under development. Considerations of large-scale engineering systems often present a dilemma of where to draw the line between a system and its environment. How are social, political, economic, and institutional issues addressed? The lack of suitable methodologies for understanding the interface between a technical system and the human and organizational it exists within is a stumbling block. The author suggests a way ahead drawing on the ancestral disciplines of systems science. This approach led to the development of a system safety engineering methodology, Systemtheoretic Accident Models and Processes (STAMP), which has had significant impact on industry and the practice of safety engineering.
Researchers and practitioners in the field of systems engineering occasionally refer to the systems they develop as socio-technical.
The socio-technical concept arose in conjunction with…several projects undertaken by the Tavistock Institute in the British Coal Mining Industry. The time [1949] was that of the postwar reconstruction of industry… The second project was led, through the circumstances described below, to include the technical as well as the social system in the factors to be considered and to postulate that the relations between them should constitute a new field of inquiry. (Trist 1981) The inclusion of human factors in the design of engineering systems was revolutionary at that time and still is today in some academic and industry circles. In 1930, MIT President Karl Compton initiated a movement to make the practice of engineering more scientific, thereby initiating the approach of engineering science. Engineering science -applied physics, chemistry, and mathematicsproved to be very successful in the Second World War. The development of Radar is often cited as a product of the engineering science approach (Mindell 2004 ). Immediately following the war, the creation of the National Science Foundation revived the question of what it meant to do basic research in an applied field such as engineering (Kline 2000) .
As systems continued to grow in size and complexity, the aerospace industry responded with what is now called systems engineering. The program for America's first ICBM, the Atlas missile, served as a test-bed for this new approach to interdisciplinary engineering system design. The Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) air defense system, which enabled the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to track, and if necessary coordinate a military response to Soviet strategic bombers, also made use of early systems engineering practices (Hughes 2000; Hughes 1998 ).
In parallel, system theorists in academia were considering many of the same concepts as industry engineers such as feedback, dynamics, flows, block diagrams, humanmachine interaction, signals, simulation, and computers (Mindell 2004) . However, as Kroes et al. point out, both groups encountered a serious problem:
The field of systems engineering has inherited a conceptual problem from systems theory. Just as systems theory since its beginnings has been plagued by the question how to separate a system from its environment or context, the field of systems engineering has been confronted with a similar question about engineering systems. How are the boundaries of [engineering] (Kroes 2004) Unfortunately, engineering science lacked the tools to address these fundamental questions in the new field of systems engineering.
The Boundary Problem
Catastrophic failures are associated with ignoring social, political, economic, and institutional elements. Mindell writes:
It is highly significant that the Columbia Accident Investigation Board identified 'history and culture' as a major contributing cause of the accident. History and culture are not mysterious, inhibiting forces that act on the technological development; they are just as integral to technology as are Newton's laws and Fourier transforms. (Mindell 2004) Another great defeat of the systems approach is associated with Robert McNamara's "Whiz Kids." "Through systems analysis, McNamara and his staff felt empowered to replace the complexity of real life with simplified models that lent illusory precision by their quantitative bases." (Jardini 1998 ) By dismissing many human variables and approaching the Vietnam War only as a national defense production problem, decisive factors in the outcome of the conflict, such as the fighting will of the North Vietnamese, were ignored.
Civilian problems such as housing, health care, education, poverty, and transportation were also studied with the systems analysis approach. Programs that modeled human factors and left room for compromise and negotiation were much more successful than those that left them out. For the unsuccessful programs, Mindell points out that "in retrospect, the engineers would often point to the detrimental effects of politics, which stifled or derailed their projects. But in doing so, they pointed to the limitations of their models, which excluded politics and the social world as external variables." (Mindell 2004) Clearly, the "socio" of socio-technical systems cannot be ignored. The work of Thomas Hughes is useful in considering large technical systems as a seamless web of social and technical elements where one distinguishes between physical artifacts, organizations, scientific components, legislative artifacts, and natural resources (Bijker ed. 1987 ). This view leads systems engineering researchers to ask the question of where to draw the boundary of the system and its environment. Furthermore, if social elements are considered, how are they to be analyzed?
One of the most conspicuous problems facing the systems engineer is the lack of formal education or on-the-job training to rigorously analyze the social forces that influence a system. An ABET accredited program does not require coursework in designing stakeholder surveys, conducting human experiments (human factors engineering), designing meaningful interviews, and other useful skills for engineering large scale, complex systems. Systems engineering researchers working on safety problems at MIT are assisted in this regard by the System Safety Working Group. The group has scholars in fields such as aerospace engineering, social psychology, computer engineering, organizational behavior, civil engineering, industrial relations, physics, and of course systems engineering. In this endeavor, a careful balancing act must be carried out. The systems engineer should acknowledge that "a systems approach is centered around the human being" and "the efficient design of systems is influenced decisively by the people who have to operate them." (Jenkins 1971 ) Nevertheless, he must also appreciate the field's scientific roots in dynamical systems theory, control theory, and biology (Emes 2006) .
In essence, the problem comes down to methodology. How can the techniques of engineering science be connected with a modern understanding of human decision making, organizational behavior, and institutional inertia?
A Way Ahead -The Ancestral Disciplines
The good news is that many people have made significant progress at answering this question.
The ancestral disciplines of systems science have much to offer 21 st century systems engineers. Unfortunately, the term "systems thinking" has been so abused and misused that it has been reduced in many circles to a consulting buzzword. However, true systems thinkers -or those that take a systems approach -should expose themselves to the richness of:
1. General System Theory 2. Cybernetics 3. System Dynamics 4. Complex Adaptive Systems 5. Control Theory. The ancestral disciplines are useful in two ways:
1. Scholars in the respective fields have confronted the human-machine problem directly and quite successfully. 2. New theories of socio-technical systems can be developed by creatively integrating the techniques of the ancestral fields. In his General System Theory, Von Bertalanffy presents the concept of an open system: "An open system is defined as a system in exchange of matter with its environment…"(von Bertalanffy 1969) The concept of an open system is an important one in applied science, because often the pure sciences (i.e. chemistry) make an assumption of a closed system -one isolated from its environment. This assumption has been implicitly imported into engineering design mental models. However, the large scale, complex systems that are the concern of the systems engineer are inherently open.
Often, engineers draw the boundary between system and environment in their models when they encounter variables that they cannot control. However, abstracting away variables that are beyond one's control does not mean they are being handled correctly. Cybernetics offers many insights into modeling human-machine systems (Ashby 1956; Wiener 1965) . Cybernetic systems are inherently purposeful, goaldirected systems. The most fundamental model of control is shown below in Figure  1 .
Figure 1. A Feedback Control System
Image Source (Leveson 2002) Perturbations to the controlled process change the process in such a way that the sensors report the change to the controller which issues orders to the actuator to move the system toward the goal condition. While this model may seem trivial, it is useful to look deeper and realize that the entire model can be inverted. The environment has its own goals. The "external" disturbances of the environment attempt to impose its own set points for the process. In a symmetric scenario, such a process will never reach a stable equilibrium (Heylighen 2001 System Dynamics addresses concepts such as dynamic complexity, bounded rationality, flawed mental models, policy analysis, nonlinear (unintuitive) behavior, causal loops, delays, stocks and flows, and many concepts relevant to sociotechnical system modeling (Sterman 2000) .
System Dynamics does not distinguish between "hard" and "soft" variables as is the case with traditional engineering models. For example, a system safety engineer can develop a technical model of the physical system (i.e. a nuclear power plant) as well as the supporting human and organizational factors. The model shown in Figure 2 , developed by Dulac and Leveson, captures important dynamic phenomenon such as "pushing the limits," "doing more with less," "delays cause pressure," and other feedback loops encountered in real world complex systems. Another ancestral discipline relevant to this discussion is the area of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). CAS such as the human brain, ecological systems, artificial neural networks, and some parallel distributed computing systems are characterized by the emergence of complex behaviors "as a result of often nonlinear spatio-temporal interactions among a large number of component systems at different levels of organization." (Chan 2001) Attributes of CAS include a reliance on distributed control, sensitivity to interconnectivity of components, coevolution of the system with its environment, sensitivity to initial conditions in the case of mathematical chaos, and avoidance of equilibrium conditions. Engineering systems that exhibit properties of CAS cannot be separated from their environment. Chan states:
CAS are dynamic systems able to adapt in and evolve with a changing environment. It is important to realize that there is no separation between a system and its environment in the idea that a system always adapts to a changing environment.
Rather, the concept to be examined is that of a system closely linked with all other related systems making up an ecosystem. Within such a context, change needs to be seen in terms of coevolution with all other related systems, rather than an adaptation to a separate and distinct environment. (Chan 2001) Therefore, it is important for systems engineers to identify whether their system may exhibit CAS properties, and if so, ensure that their models acknowledge the intimate connection between the engineered system and environment.
Agent-based modeling has been shown to be a valuable technique for understanding complex adaptive systems (Krenzke 2006) .
Finally, control theory must be reexamined for its applicability to sociotechnical systems. While many engineers have taken courses in this area and some have developed specialization in it, engineers tend to assume that the central ideas are limited to purely electrical and mechanical systems. Notions of feedback, stability, controllability, observability, and robustness can be applied creatively to improve the design and analysis of sociotechnical systems. System theorists generally acknowledge three types of structural organization. Organized simplicity is exhibited in traditional deterministic systems that can easily be decomposed into subsystems and components such as in structural mechanics. Systems that exhibit unorganized complexity on the other hand cannot be decomposed into parts. However, statistical techniques are applicable because of the regularity and randomness that characterize the system. The Law of Large Numbers becomes applicable and average values can be computed such as in statistical mechanics. The "new" complexity, organized complexity, describes systems that are too complex to be modeled with analytic reduction but not random enough to be modeled using statistics (Owens 2006) . Figure 3 shows the relationship between the three types of organization.
Abstractions for complex systems often involve layers. In the case where hierarchy exists, the level of organization increases as one moves toward higher layers. Additionally, the step from level n to n + 1 yields new properties that are not discernable at level n. This phenomenon is referred to as emergence, or emergent properties (Leveson 2002) . As the next section will illustrate, reliability techniques that are effective for systems exhibiting organized simplicity are not necessarily applicable to systems exhibiting organized complexity.
System-Theoretic Accident Models and Processes (STAMP)
Traditional models of accident causation are rooted in a chain-of-events perspective.
In the reactor shut-down system, nuclear engineers with decades of experience can probably develop trees that satisfy the first two assumptions due to their intimate knowledge of reactor design and operation. Furthermore, component technologies such as electrical relays could be extensively tested in the laboratory to compute reliability metrics such as mean time between failures (MTBF).
Whether part of a preliminary hazard analysis or an accident reconstruction activity, the engineer attempts to understand the potential or actual accident by identifying the events or faults that could initiate the accident. Such fault and event trees are usually part of a method called probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). The goals of PRA are to estimate both the likelihood and severity of a risk. PRA was developed in the mid 1970s to improve nuclear power plant safety. Professor Norm Rasmussen of MIT chaired the Reactor Safety Study that was the first real probabilistic risk assessment (Apostolakis 2000) .
However, when complex systems like the Space Shuttle are considered, serious questions arise regarding the appropriateness of PRA. For instance, how does software change the picture? How can the MTBF of unique digital electronics be estimated? How many events or faults must be accounted for? Herein lies the problem of applying PRA to software-intensive systems. Software does not wear out and fail; it only implements a set of requirements that may or may not be correct. Subjective probability (expert judgment) must be used when thousands of laboratory MTBF tests cannot be carried out. If a spacecraft computer has 128 MB of memory, or 2 30 bits, then it has 2 number of bits or 2 2^30 states. Clearly, each state cannot be analyzed.
A probabilistic risk assessment is a four step process:
1. Identify undesirable events. 2. Identify accident scenarios (sequences of events). 3. Estimate the probability of each scenario either based on statistical testing data, or expert judgment if scenarios are rare. 4. Rank the accident scenarios according to likelihood. The framework yields a probability for each undesirable event identified in stage 1.
Before the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, NASA headquarters reported the probability of a failure with loss of vehicle and human life as 10 -5 (Feynman 1986 ). Before the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster, the reported probability was 1/250 (Stamatelatos 2002) . According to NASA space operations spokesman, Allard Beutel, the post-Columbia figure is now 1/100 (Scottberg 2006) . PRA turned out to be very successful for assessing risks in nuclear power shut-down systems. Such systems were historically very simple, electro-mechanical systems designed to minimize unnecessary complexity and used proven analog electrical technologies. PRA carries with it a number of important assumptions:
1. The events or faults in the trees are collectively exhaustive -all possible events are identified.
Formal methods have also been proposed as a solution to the software safety problem.
However, the complexity of formal specifications can quickly become unmanageable in large systems. In fact, it is possible for a formal specification to be longer and more error prone than the source code it specifies (Leveson 2002 Figure 4 , STAMP utilizes ideas from the ancestral systems science disciplines as well as traditional systems engineering.
3. Define the control structure. 4. Identify instances of inadequate control that could lead to a hazard. 5. Model the behavioral dynamics of the system with System Dynamics. An example of system-level hazards for an air traffic control system is given in (Leveson 2002 8. An aircraft enters a runway for which it does not have a clearance. 9. A controlled aircraft executes an extreme maneuver beyond its performance envelope. 10. Loss of aircraft control It is important to note that this approach is "top-down" as opposed to the "bottom-up" approaches like event trees that must identify every undesired event and trace it up to the unsafe state, or hazard. Consistent with other systems engineering activities, hazards are decomposed to the point where Figure 4 . Ancestral Roots of STAMP they can be managed. This top-down approach produces a manageable number of hazards, rather than an unmanageable number of undesirable events.
Safety constraints are simply negative requirements. For example, the constraints for hazard 3 are "a) ATC must not issue advisories that direct an aircraft into restricted airspace unless avoiding a greater hazard. b) ATC shall provide timely warnings to aircraft to prevent their incursion into restricted airspace." (Leveson 2002 ) System safety engineers are very familiar with writing requirements so safety constraints are a natural extension.
Utilizing the principles of control theory, a control structure is developed for the socio-technical system.
Constraints are assigned to individual components in the structure, and control actions are defined to implement the constraints. The generic model of control is provided below in Figure  5 . Many accidents are not associated with component failure. Instead, they are the result of a slow degradation of the safety culture supporting the system and the development or operations enterprise. Systems migrate toward a state of greater risk in such a way that the evolution is not appreciated until an accident occurs. This notion of evolution is well understood with the techniques of Complex Adaptive Systems.
Identifying instances of inadequate control is a process of studying the control structure for ways that feedback, or more generally control, could be disrupted. A hierarchical taxonomy of such risks has been identified with the following three types at the highest level:
1. Finally, System Dynamics modeling is used to understand the behavioral dynamics of the system (Dulac 2005) . Inadequate controls previously identified can be prioritized by quantitatively assessing their impact on key system safety variables. Additionally, response mechanisms can be tested, and their effectiveness judged (Laracy 2006) .
Conclusion
Modeling large scale, complex systems is not an easy task. Addressing boundary issues between the technical system and the environment are particularly difficult. Often interdisciplinary expertise is needed to address the spectrum of challenges present in socio-technical systems. At MIT, the System Safety Working Group's unifying methodology, STAMP, draws from the ancestral systems sciences. By studying the ideas of the earlier systems scientists and developing new theories of socio-technical systems from them, systems engineers can hope to live up to the standards of General Bernard Schriever of the Air Force Research and Development Command. General Schriever once remarked that a systems engineering contractor should be staffed by "'unusually competent' scientists and engineers to direct the technical and management control over all elements of the program." (Hallam 2001) 
